
























Friendly Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Jammers
Minsu Kim, Seongjun Kim, and Jemin Lee
Abstract—In this paper, we analyze the impact of a friendly
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) jammer on UAV communications
in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. We first present chan-
nel components determined by the line-of-sight (LoS) probability
between the friendly UAV jammer and the ground device, and
introduce different channel fadings for LoS and non-line-of-sight
(NLoS) links. We then derive the secrecy transmission probability
satisfying both constraints of legitimate and wiretap channels. We
also analyze the secrecy transmission probability in the presence
of randomly distributed multiple friendly UAV jammers. Finally,
we show the existence of the optimal UAV jammer location, and
the impact of the density of eavesdroppers, the transmission
power of the UAV jammer, and the density of UAV jammers
on the optimal location.
Index Terms—Unmanned aerial vehicle, physical layer security,
line-of-sight probability, secrecy transmission probability
I. INTRODUCTION
As an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) communication has
several advantages such as the line-of-sight (LoS) environment
and their flexible mobility, many researchers have studied the
use of UAVs as a communication device [1]. Specifically,
by using the relation between the LoS probability and the
distance-dependent path loss, the optimal positioning of UAVs
has been mainly studied. When the UAV height increases,
the link between the UAV and the ground device forms the
better link due to increasing LoS signal, while the link distance
increases. Hence, several works optimized the UAV height to
improve the communication performance [2], [3].
In UAV communications, the secrecy is also an impor-
tant issue due to the broadcast nature of wireless channels.
To overcome this, the physical layer security has recently
emerged as an effective approach for communication secrecy
[4], [5]. Different from terrestrial communications, in UAV
communications, the UAV and the ground devices form LoS
links with higher probability, so malicious eavesdroppers as
well as legitimate receivers can receive the signal from the
transmitting UAV with higher power. Hence, the works in
[6], [7] provided the optimal deployment and trajectory of
UAVs, which improve the effect of the jamming signal to
the eavesdroppers, while reducing the effect of the interfering
signal to the receivers. Specifically, the optimal UAV height
and the transmit power were presented to minimize the secrecy
outage probability in [6]. The intercept probability and the
ergodic secrecy rate were presented by considering the effect
of the UAV height and the transmit power in [7]. However, the
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works in [6], [7] did not consider the friendly jammer which
can reduce the eavesdropping probability.
Recently, the friendly jammer has been considered in [8]–
[11] to improve the secrecy performance. For the case of the
friendly terrestrial jammer, the optimal secrecy guard zone
radius was presented to maximize secrecy throughput in [8].
Different from terrestrial communications, the UAV and the
ground devices form LoS links with higher probability in
UAV communications. Hence, the friendly UAV jammer can
generally give stronger jamming signals to eavesdroppers than
a terrestrial jammer by having LoS links to eavesdroppers.
Furthermore, the friendly UAV jammer can also be readily
located to maximize the jamming efficiency as it has on-
demand mobility. Therefore, in recent works such as [9]–
[11], the friendly UAV jammer has also been considered.
Specifically, the secrecy energy efficiency was presented to
analyze the effect of the transmission power and the density
ratio of transmitters to eavesdroppers in [9]. The optimal UAV
height and the secrecy guard zone size were presented to
maximize the secrecy transmission capacity in [10]. The opti-
mal deployment and transmission power of the friendly UAV
jammer were provided to maximize the intercept probability
security region in [11]. However, the works in [9], [10] focused
on the effect of the density ratio of friendly UAV jammers to
eavesdroppers instead of the specific location of the friendly
UAV jammer. The optimal location of a friendly UAV jammer
was presented in [11], but the channel fading for the air-to-
ground (A2G) channel was not considered. In addition, the
work in [11] did not show the effect of the eavesdropper
density on the optimal location of the friendly UAV jammer.
In this paper, we present the effect of a friendly UAV
jammer on the secrecy transmission probability. We consider
channel fadings and components, affected by horizontal and
vertical distances between the friendly UAV jammer and the
ground devices including eavesdroppers. The main contribu-
tions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• we consider realistic channel model, determined by the
LoS probability between a friendly UAV jammer and a
ground device;
• we derive the secrecy transmission probability consider-
ing different channel fadings for LoS and non-line-of-
sight (NLoS) links;
• we also analyze the secrecy transmission probability by
considering multiple UAV jammers, randomly distributed
in the network; and
• we finally show the optimal location of the friendly
UAV jammer that maximizes the secrecy transmission
probability according to the eavesdropper density and the
transmission power of the friendly UAV jammer.
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Fig. 1. System model where multiple eavesdroppers are randomly distributed
on the ground and a friendly UAV jammer is in the air. The blue lines represent
transmitting signals from the transmitter and the red dotted lines represent
interfering signals from the friendly UAV jammer.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we describe the UAV network and the
channel model, affected by horizontal and vertical distances
between the friendly UAV jammer and ground devices.
A. Network Description
We consider the UAV network with a transmitter (Tx), a
legitimate receiver (Rx), a friendly UAV jammer (Jammer),
and multiple eavesdroppers (Eves) as shown in Fig. 1. On the
ground, the Tx and the Rx are located at qt = (0, 0, 0) and
qr = (xr, yr, 0), respectively. Eves are randomly distributed
by a Poisson point process (PPP) Φe , {qei} with density
λe, where qei = (xei , yei , 0) is the location of an arbitrary
Eve [12]. Each Eve decodes the received signal from the
Tx independently, i.e., we consider non-colluding Eves. The
Jammer is placed in an adjustable location qu = (xu, yu, zu).
In this network, we assume the Tx and the Jammer do not
know the locations of Eves. We also assume the legitimate
channel (between Tx and Rx in the presence of Jammer) and
the wiretap channel (between Tx and Eves in the presence of
Jammer) are independent.1
Based on qt, qr, qei , and qu, we define the signal-to-
interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of the legitimate channel





hucjc(dc, zu)−αucPu + σ2
=
htcρc
hucτc(dc, zu) + σ2





c is the link distance between the Tx
and the Rx (c = r) or the Eve (c = ei), jc(dc, zu) =
√
(xu − xc)2 + (yu − yc)2 + z2u is the link distance between
the Jammer and the Rx (c = r) or the Eve (c = ei), Pt
and Pu are the transmission power of the Tx and the Jammer,
respectively, and σ2 is the noise power. Here, htc and huc are
channel fading gains, and αtc and αuc are path loss exponents,
where the subscript tc represents the transmission from the
1If the eavesdroppers are more than half-wavelength away from the
legitimate users, the legitimate users experience independent channels to
eavesdroppers [13].
Tx to the Rx (c = r) or the Eve (c = ei), and the subscript
uc represents the transmission from the Jammer to the Rx
(c = r) or the Eve (c = ei).
2 In (1), for convenience, we
introduce ρc = ℓ
−αtc




(xu − xc)2 + (yu − yc)2 is horizontal distance
between the Jammer and the Rx (c = r) or the Eve (c = ei),





c − 2dtuℓc cos θc (2)
where dtu is the horizontal distance between the Jammer and
the Tx, and θc is the included angle between ℓc and dtu as
shown in Fig. 1.
B. Channel Model
Since all the devices except for the Jammer are located on
the ground, there can be two types of channels, which are the
ground-to-ground (G2G) channel and the A2G channel. The
G2G channel between ground devices is commonly modeled
as the NLoS environment with the Rayleigh fading due to a lot
of obstacles. On the other hand, the A2G channel between the
Jammer and the ground device (e.g., the interference link to
Rx and the jamming link to Eve) can have the LoS or NLoS
environment according to the existence of obstacles. In this
subsection, we introduce channel components and provide the
model of the A2G channel.
1) Channel component: On UAV communications, channel
components such as the LoS probability and the path loss
exponent are affected by the horizontal distance dc and the
vertical distance zu between a Jammer and a Rx (c = r) or a
Eve (c = ei). First, when the heights of ground devices are
sufficiently small, the LoS probability, pL(dc, zu), c ∈ {r, ei},




































dt is the Q-function, and ζ,
ν, and µ are environment parameters, determined by the build-
ing density and height. We then define the NLoS probability as
pN(dc, zu) = 1−pL(dc, zu). Note that the LoS probability can
be applicable in various environments (e.g., urban, suburban,
and dense urban) by adjusting the environment parameters.
In addition, the path loss exponent αuc is determined by αL
when the A2G channel is in the LoS environment. Otherwise,
αuc = αN.
2) Air-to-Ground (A2G) channel: In the A2G channel, as
the received signal power at the ground device is affected
by the combination of the LoS and NLoS signals [16], we
consider that the channel fading is the Nakagami-m fading
with mean HL = 1 for the LoS environment and the Rayleigh
2Note that the instantaneous channel state information (CSI), which is
generally difficult to obtain especially for eavesdropping links, is not required
in this work. Only the location of Tx and Rx as well as the densities of
eavesdroppers and Jammers are needed to determine the location of Jammer.
3The LoS probability is also defined in [15], but it is determined by the ratio
of the vertical and horizontal link distances, not by the absolute distances. On
the other hand, the one in [14] is affected by the absolute positions of the Tx
and Rx, and it can be applicable for more general cases.
3
fading with mean HN = 1 for the NLoS environment. There-
fore, the distribution of channel fading gains, huc, c ∈ {r, ei},












(h) = exp (−h) for NLoS (4)
where mL is the Nakagami-m fading parameter and Γ(z) =
∫∞
0 x
z−1e−xdx is the gamma function.
III. SECRECY TRANSMISSION PROBABILITY ANALYSIS
In this section, for given dr and zu, we analyze the secrecy
transmission probability pse(dr, zu), which is the probability
that a Tx reliably transmits signals to a Rx, while all the Eves
fail to eavesdrop, and is defined as [8]









where γt and γ
′
t are target SINRs of the legitimate channel
and the wiretap channel, respectively.
Lemma 1: The secrecy transmission probability can be
presented as
pse(dr, zu) = ps(dr, zu)(1− pe(zu)) (6)


































In (8), ps,ei(ℓei , θei , zu) = P [γei > γ
′
t ], which is presented




Proof: For given qt, qu, qei , and qr, we can obtain the
secrecy transmission probability pse(dr, zu) as









= ps(dr, zu)(1 − pe(zu)) (9)
where ps(dr, zu) = P [γr > γt] is the successful transmission









probability, and (a) is obtained due to the independence
between the legitimate channel and the wiretap channel. In








= p(L)s (dr, zu)pL(dr, zu) + p
(N)
s (dr, zu)pN(dr, zu) (10)
4For given zu, even though the eavesdropping probability pe(zu) cannot be




s (dr, zu) is the successful transmission probability
in the environment of the interference link eI, given by





















































Here, (a) is from the cumulative distribution function (CDF)
of the exponential distribution. In (11), by [17, eq. (3.326)],
the integral term can be expressed as
∫ ∞
0
xm exp (−βxn) dx = Γ(γ)
nβγ
(13)




By using (13) in (11) and the definite integral in (12), ps(dr, zu)
is presented as (7).


















By using the probability generating functional (PGFL) in (14),
pe(zu) is presented as (8).
From Lemma 1, we can know that ps(dr, zu) and pe(zu)
decrease with mL. Using this result, the impact of mL on
pse(dr, zu) is shown and discussed in the numerical results.
Corollary 1: For given zu, ℓr, and dtu, the optimal value of
θr that maximizes pse(dtu, zu, θr) is π.




0 ps,ei(ℓei , θei , zu)ℓeidℓeidθei and represent pse(dr, zu) as
functions of dtu, zu, and θr as
pse(dtu, zu, θr) = ps(dtu, zu, θr) exp {−λeF (dtu, zu)} . (15)
In (15), for given zu, ℓr, and dtu, we obtain the first derivative
of pse(dtu, zu, θr) with respect to θr as
∂pse(dtu, zu, θr)
∂θr











s (dtu, zu, θr)
∂θr
×pL(dtu, zu, θr) +
∂p
(N)





In (16), for zu > 0, p
(L)
s (dtu, zu, θr) − p(N)s (dtu, zu, θr) < 0,












= C3 sin(θr) for positive C1,
C2, and C3. Hence, the stationary values of θr are ob-
tained when sin(θr) = 0. Furthermore, we readily know that
ps(dtu, zu, π) is greater than ps(dtu, zu, 0) because pL(dtu, zu, π)
is smaller than pL(dtu, zu, 0) and τr(dtu, zu, π) is smaller than
4
τr(dtu, zu, 0). Therefore, the optimal value of θr that maximizes
pse(dtu, zu, θr) is π.
From Corollary 1, we can see that the Jammer needs to be
located along the line from the Rx to the Tx. Hence, in Section
V, we analyze pse(dtu, zu, π) instead of pse(dtu, zu, θr).
We now present the asymptotic secrecy transmission prob-
ability when the Jammer is located near to the Tx.
Corollary 2: As the Jammer approaches to the Tx, the
asymptotic secrecy transmission probability can be given by

























where ps(dr, zu) is given in (7).
Proof: In (8), as dtu → 0 (i.e., when the Jammer
approaches to the Tx with the height zu), the eavesdropping
probability pe(zu) can be given by

















































In (18), when zu is small, pL(ℓei , zu) approaches to zero and





















Using the following result [17, eq. (3.326)]
∫ ∞
0
xm exp (−βxn) dx = Γ(γ)
nβγ
(20)




, and γ = m+1
n
, pe in (19)
can be presented in a closed-form. Finally, we can obtain the
asymptotic expression of pse(dr, zu) as (17).
From Corollary 2, we can readily see the effect of the
network parameters (e.g., main link distance and transmission
power of Tx) on the secrecy transmission probability.
IV. SECRECY TRANSMISSION PROBABILITY ANALYSIS
WITH MULTIPLE UAV JAMMERS
In this section, we now consider multiple UAV jammers,
which are randomly distributed by a PPP Φu with density λu
at the height zu. The channel components and fading gains
between the typical Jammer and the ground device are the
same as the single Jammer case. From the secrecy transmission
probability in (6), we obtain the secrecy transmission proba-
bility for multiple UAV jammers in the following corollary.
Corollary 3: In the presence of multiple UAV jammers, the


















































s (r, zu) is the successful transmission probability of
the interference limited environment (i.e., σ2 = 0 in (11) and
(12)) and r is the horizontal distance between the Jammer and
the Rx. In (21), p̂
(eJ)
s,ei (v, zu) is obtained from p̂
(eI)
s (r, zu) by
replacing duir, ρr, and γt with duiei , ρei , and γ
′
t , respectively.
Here, eJ is the environment of the jamming link and v is the
horizontal distance between the Jammer and the Eve.
Proof: For given zu, the secrecy transmission probability

















































































































where (a) is obtained because htr ∼ exp(1) and htei ∼ exp(1),
and (b) is from the CDF of huir and huiei . By using the PGFL
in (22), p̃se(zu) is presented as (21).
In a similar way to the Corollary 2, we provide the
asymptotic analysis of the secrecy transmission probability for
multiple UAV jammers. Specifically, in (21), when zu goes
zero, pL(r, zu) and pL(v, zu) approach to zero and the secrecy





































































Γ (1 + n)
(24)
with p = γtPuℓ
αN





), q = Pt, ν = αN, µ = 2,
and n = 0. By using (24) in (23) and Γ(x)Γ(1−x) = πsin(πx) ,




























































In (25), when αN = 4, by substituting ℓ
2
ei






































































with β = Pt4γ′t σ2









, p̃se in (26) can be















































dt is the error function.
From this result, we can see the effect of λu on the secrecy
transmission probability.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the secrecy transmission prob-
ability depending on the location and the transmission power
of the Jammer. Unless otherwise specified, the values of
simulation parameters are αN = 3.5, αL = 2.5, mL = 2,
ν=5× 10−4, µ=0.3, ζ=15, R=10000m, γt = 3, γ′t = 2.5,
Pt = 10
−8W , Pu = 3× 10−10W , and σ2 = 3× 10−19W .
Figure 2 presents the secrecy transmission probability
pse(dtu, zu, π) as a function of the horizontal distance between
the Jammer and the Tx dtu with ℓr = 340m for different values
of the Eve density λe and the Jammer height zu. From Fig.
2, we can see that pse(dtu, zu, π) first increases with dtu up to
a certain value of dtu, and then decreases. This is because














λe = 5× 10−7[nodes/m2]
































Fig. 2. Secrecy transmission probabilities pse(dtu, zu, π) as a function of dtu
with ℓr = 340m for different values of λe and zu. The optimal values of dtu
are marked by circles.

















λe = 1.2× 10−8[nodes/m2]
λe = 7× 10−8[nodes/m2]
λe = 3.5× 10−7[nodes/m2]
λe = 7.5× 10−7[nodes/m2]
λe = 9.3× 10−7[nodes/m2]































Fig. 3. Secrecy transmission probability pse(dtu, zu, π) as functions of zu
and dtu with λe=7.5×10−7[nodes/m2] and ℓr=420m. The optimal Jammer
locations for each λe that maximize pse(dtu, zu, π) are marked by symbols.
for small dtu, the decrease in the LoS probability of the
interference link to the receiver is greater than that of the
jamming link to the Eve with max
ei∈Φe
γei , who mainly affects the
eavesdropping probability. On the other hand, for large dtu, as
dtu increases, the Eve with max
ei∈Φe
γei can be located closer to the
Tx than the Rx, so pse(dtu, zu, π) decreases with dtu. We can
also see that as λe increases, the optimal value of dtu decreases
to make the jamming link stronger as there exist more Eves.
From this, we can find out that as the density of Eves increases,
the Jammer needs to be located nearer to the Tx. In Fig. 2, we
can additionally see the impact of mL on pse(dr, zu) according
to dtu. Specifically, for small dtu, pse(dr, zu) decreases with mL
since ps(dr, zu) decreases with mL more than pe(zu). On the
other hand, for large dtu, pse(dr, zu) increases with mL since
ps(dr, zu) becomes similar for different mL, but pe(zu) still
decreases with mL. Hence, the optimal value of dtu increases
with mL, which means the Jammer needs to be located further
from the Tx as mL increases. Furthermore, we can know that
the asymptotic analysis almost matches the analytic analysis as
the Jammer approaches to the Tx (i.e., as dtu → 0 for zu = 0).
Figure 3 presents the secrecy transmission probability
pse(dtu, zu, π) as functions of the Jammer height zu and the
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λu = 7× 10−6[nodes/m2]
λu = 9× 10−6[nodes/m2]
Pu = 2× 10−11W
Pu = 3× 10−11W






Fig. 4. Secrecy transmission probability p̃se(zu) as a function of zu for
different values of λu and Pu. The optimal values of zu are marked by circles.
horizontal distance between the Tx and the Jammer dtu with
ℓr = 420m. The symbols mean the optimal Jammer locations,
z∗u and d
∗
tu, for each Eve density λe. From Fig. 3, we can
see that d∗tu first decrease with λe up to a certain value of
λe, and then increase. This is because, for small λe (e.g.,
λe ≤ 7×10−8nodes/m2), since there exist less eavesdroppers,
the Jammer needs to be located at the low height to reduce
the LoS probability of interference link to the Rx. However,
for relatively high λe (e.g., λe = 3.5 × 10−7nodes/m2),
the Jammer needs to be located closer to the Tx, especially
by reducing the horizontal distance dtu for giving stronger
jamming signal to Eves, although it also gives larger inter-
ference to the Rx. Additionally, when λe is much higher (e.g.,
λe ≥ 7.5 × 10−7nodes/m2), since there exist many Eves, the
Jammer needs to give much stronger jamming signal to Eves.
Hence, the Jammer is located at the high height to increase
the LoS probability of the jamming link.
Figure 4 presents the secrecy transmission probability
p̃se(zu) as a function of the height of UAV jammers zu for
different values of the UAV jammer density λu and the trans-
mission power of the UAV jammer. Here, we use ℓr = 50m
and λe = 10
−5nodes/m2. From Fig. 4, we can see that p̃se(zu)
first increases with zu up to a certain value of zu, and then
decreases. This is because for small zu, the increase in the
LoS probability of the jamming link is greater than that of the
interference link. On the other hand, for large zu, the LoS
probability of the interference link keeps increasing, while
the distance-dependent path loss of the eavesdropping link
decreases. Therefore, p̃se(zu) decreases with zu when large
zu. We can also see that as λu increases, the optimal value
of zu decreases to give weaker LoS probability (i.e., weaker
signal) on the interference link to the Rx. Furthermore, the
optimal value of zu increases as Pu increases. From these
results, we can know that when the effect of UAV jammers
is strong enough by using the larger transmit power, the UAV
jammers need to be located at the low height to reduce the
LoS probability of the interfering signal at the Rx or located
at the high height to decrease the distance-dependent path loss
of the interference link.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper derives and analyzes the secrecy transmission
probability of UAV communications considering the realistic
channel models affected by the communication link. Using
the derived expression, we show the effect of a UAV friendly
jammer on network parameters. Specifically, as the UAV
height increases, the distance-dependent path loss decreases,
but the LoS probability for jamming signal increases. From
this relation, we show that there can exists an optimal UAV
height, which decreases as the density of UAV jammers
increases for the multiple Jammer case. We also provide that
as the Eve density increases or the Jammer height becomes
lower, the optimal horizontal distance between the Jammer and
the transmitter decreases to make the jamming link stronger.
The outcomes of this work can provide insights on the
optimal deployment of the friendly UAV jammer that prevents
eavesdropping while reducing the interference to the receiver.
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